Slave wives and transgressive unions in biblical and ancient Near East law by Jacobus, HR
4Slave Wives and Transgressive Unions
in Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern
Laws and Literature
Helen R. Jacobus
Prologue
Several years ago, I attended a talk within the Orthodox Jewish community in
London on monogamy among the patriarchs. As it sounded intriguing, given
the polygamous situation in Jacob’s household, I was curious to hear what this
well-known rabbi had to say on the matter. The focus of the lecture was Isaac
and Rebecca, who were indeed monogamous. The issue of polygamy among
the patriarchs was never mentioned.
After the presentation, the rabbi asked the audience if there were any
questions. As something was clearly missing from this talk, there was a pause,
or perhaps the fall of silence may have been due to the awe the audience felt
toward the speaker. Following what seemed like a very long time, a young man
asked for the rabbi’s opinion on Abraham’s marriage. (No one, it seemed, dare
ask about his view on Jacob.)
The rabbi replied that of course Abraham’s marriage to Sarah was
monogamous, and then, as an aside, he added, jokingly, “apart from the
handmaiden.” There was some laughter, possibly out of politeness for the
revered man’s joke, or embarrassment, or, who knows? But not everyone
laughed. I was sitting near a young black woman, who had told me earlier that
she was converting to Judaism. She and I exchanged glances, both of us feeling
shocked.
I have no idea why I have always been interested in Hagar and Bilhah,
and the issue of oppression. But my idea now, as a writer reading the biblical
text, is that the composers and redactors of these richly layered, complex stories
55
knew what they were doing. Those biblical characters were never meant to be
understood in the way that this Orthodox rabbi does: inconvenient characters
to be avoided, not to be looked at in the eye, mentally cast into the wilderness.
I now see his attitude as a problem arises when institutionalized theology meets
biblical literature: the two cannot interact openly and honestly without an
enormous amount of difficulty.
Sometime later, I came across the ancient Near Eastern (ANE) law code,
the Law of Hammurabi1 146, which I will look at later in this essay. In my view,
the law seems to be dramatized in the text of Gen. 16:3-7. I put a bookmark
on the page, and mentally filed away this information as an idea to research
for an article one day. The call for papers for the Contextual Interpretation
of the Bible was the starting pistol, an opportunity for me to bring together
and explore all these disparate threads: the “joke” about “the handmaiden”; the
dramatic characterization and writing in the biblical text, which is a never-
ending journey; an endless fascination with the marginal women in the Bible,
such as Hagar, Bilhah, and Tamar; and my surprise at the possible role that ANE
laws may have played in biblical literary constructions.
Introduction
This essay contends that biblical narratives were composed in the knowledge
that audiences were familiar with different ANE legal codes in cuneiform,
as well as Hebrew biblical laws on conjugal relations and inheritance laws
involving slave wives. I suggest that much of the drama in the Bible is created
by main characters contravening written biblical and ANE laws, and that
audiences would be aware that such frissons were being referenced.
Furthermore, those breaches of legal codes form the subtext of the story lines;
indeed, the characters’ contraventions add so much depth and dramatic irony to
the narratives that it is unlikely they have not been created or harmonized in
this reverse way.
The narrative structures selected below work with proscriptive ANE laws
on conjugal relationships with female slaves and free women in particular.
Surprisingly, in the case of Hittite Laws,2 there is a correspondence with the
relevant group of laws on permitted sexual partnering and revisionist versions
of this legislation in Leviticus 18.3 On a similar note, David Wright, in his
detailed study of the Covenant Code (CC) (Exod. 20:23—23:19) and the Laws
Hammurabi (LH) noticed that the CC followed the LH in sequence (Wright
2009: vii). He concluded that “the role of the CC from beginning to end reflects
a calculated use of LH” (Wright 2009: 344). His arguments, first put forward
in 2003, have been critically accepted with reservations by Bruce Wells, who
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argues that Wright has probably overstated the case for an actual direct linear
dependence of the CC on the LH (Wells 2006: 118). By contrast, Calum
Carmichael relates biblical laws to biblical narratives, but his exegesis has not
found wide scholarly acceptance (see, for example, Carmichael 2010; Fischer
2012). My postulations cover much the same ground as Carmichael, but my
interpretations are completely different from his, and I bring ANE laws into the
equation more frequently.
I put forward the proposal that the behavior of many main characters
contravenes ANE family laws, some of which are neither replicated nor echoed
in the Bible, but ancient audiences must have known of such codes because the
references are so clearly marked in the stories. Furthermore, some of the laws
in the biblical code were specifically invented to heighten the narrative. These
did not emanate from ANE antecedents and had no other purpose other than
as theatrical props in the story line. Other biblical laws are clearly signposted
in the drama and have ANE precedents but have been specifically tailored from
cuneiform legal codes to intersect with the stories. The narratives that they
underline may have even been inspired by the earlier Mesopotamian material.
I argue that audiences would have understood the ironic literary conceit
implying that biblical laws on transgressive unions postdate the characters’
actions and choices; hence, the characters cannot be fully culpable of their
offenses because those laws did not yet exist. Noticeably, however, they then
become aware and consciously do not repeat the offense after the fact (for
example, Gen 38:26d). The central story analyzed in this essay pertains to
the Jacob cycle, with particular reference to Reuben and Bilhah (Gen. 35:22).
The narratives of Judah and Tamar (Gen. 38), and Hagar and Ishmael (Gen.
16:1—18:5; 21:1-21; 22:2, 6-7, 10, 16) are discussed using the same paradigm.
The biblical dramas discussed here are created by deliberate, highly
intricate paradoxes, lacunae in the biblical laws that bridge one statute to
another, and by the ambiguity about which laws, precisely, are being referenced
and crisscrossed in the text. Often, several laws are involved. The laws are
characters; that is, virtual dramatis personae: they have a presence in the scenes
selected and referenced in this study, and they interact with the wider narrative.
My specific interest concerns the challenging nature of some of these stories
that—as I argue—illuminate moral and legal codes. In the cases of Hagar, Zilpah,
and Bilhah, the narratives sympathetically highlight the dearth of biblical laws
concerning slave wives of the master. This is in clear contrast to the slave
women’s roles as second (and third and fourth) wives and surrogates in the
biblical stories, and the plethora of legislation concerning them and their
children in ANE laws. An “audience-aware, legal-literary framework” can be
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used to analyze difficult layers of text in the Bible, offering an integrated,
holistic perspective, as opposed to taking a separate legal approach (such as
Carmichael 1985, Levinson 1997, or Jackson 2007), or a literary critical analysis
(such as Alter 1981) as single areas of study.
Transgressive Relations in Drama and ANE Law Codes:
A Comparative Context
Human psychology and feelings seem to play less of a role as sources of
motivation for actions and character development in the biblical stories,
compared with Greek mythology and drama. One of the differences between
the use of transgressed family laws and taboos in classical myths and plays
is that classical dramatists may have been more interested in incest taboos
as powerful thematic infrastructures in order to uncover the psychology of
mythological dramatis personae such as Oedipus, Electra, and Phaedra. The
characters’ emotions propel them on journeys of personal inner change in order
to effect inevitable tragedy. Hence, it may be suggested that ANE law codes
in antiquity, particularly those on sexual and behavioral transgressions within
the family group, may have inspired some of the most famous classical dramas,
although in classical Greece the prohibition against incest was an “unwritten
law.”4 There is no reason, though, why audiences would not have been aware
of other written law codes and legal literature in the region.
Given that this idea is speculative, one may suggest that Sophocles’s
Oedipus the King (Storr 1932) could have been directly influenced by the law
that a man should not have intercourse with his mother after his father’s death
(LH 157: Roth 1997: 111) or simply not have sexual relations with his mother
(HL 189: Roth 1997: 236; Lev. 18:6-7a).
Euripides’s (Kovacs 1998) and Sophocles’s (Storr 1967) Electra may be not
about suppressed desire for the father (a popular interpretation we owe to Jung
[1912: 69]) forbidding father-daughter sexual relations (LH 154: Roth 1997:
110; no biblical prohibition), but about the implementation of the punishment
for a wife who has her husband killed so as to marry another man. Legally
approved retribution is explicitly stated in the final scenes of both versions of
the plays. Given that the laws in the tragedies are not necessarily identical
to the unwritten legal codes, some poetic license must be understood. The
punishment in ANE law for the instigating, adulterous wife is impalement
(LH 153: Roth 1997:110; no corresponding offense in the Bible). In Euripides’s
version of Electra, Orestes, Electra’s brother, kills their mother, Clytemnestra, by
driving a sword down her throat and murdering her husband.5 Under Greek
58 | Leviticus and Numbers
Draconian law, the price would certainly be death; in later law, the penalty of
death or exile would be decided by the family of the victim. Euripides, however,
does not seem to approve of “blood for blood” in Orestes (Allen 2005: 508).
Forbidden relations between in-laws are reflected in Euripides’s drama
Hippolytus, where Phaedra is afflicted by an unrequited longing for her
eponymous stepson (Kovacs 1995). The inspiration for a story line of emotional
incest may have been inspired by the prohibition on such a union in ANE
and Hebrew laws (LH 190: Roth 1997: 236; Lev. 20:11; Deut. 23:1; Deut.
27:20), creating a greater dramatic twist than a tale of unrequited love between
nonrelatives. The familial relationship between Bilhah and Reuben, stepson and
stepmother, is the same, but the story is different and the relationship rules much
more complicated and unclear, as will be discussed below.
In the Bible, some threads of authorial interest in the literary reenactment
of law codes revolve around the consequences of these broken taboos on
inheritance, future generations, and the status of being an ancestor in the sacred
genealogy of David. The purpose of the biblical legal-literary dramas may be to
set boundaries and fixed social positions for the descendants to come.
Narrative-Dependent Laws
An example of a biblical law probably borne by the needs of the narrative is
Deut. 21:15-17:
If a man has two wives, one loved and one hated and both the loved
and the hated have borne him sons, but the first born is the son of
the hated one, on the day he bequeaths his estate to his sons, he may
not treat the first-born son of the loved one in preference to the son
of the hated one, who is the first-born. Instead, he must accept the
first-born, the son of the hated one, and allot to him a double portion
of all he possesses; since he is the first fruit of his vigor, ונא תישׁ אר,
the right of the firstborn is his.6
This is a key law in the story of the loss of Reuben’s birthright, his punishment
from Jacob for sleeping with Bilhah. A major theme in Genesis is the usurping
by the younger brother of the elder, the overturning of primogeniture. The
law alludes to Jacob’s two elder sons by different wives. This rule appears to
specifically refer to the inheritance rights of Reuben, a law tailored to give a
double portion to the firstborn son of the hated wife. In particular, Deut. 21:17
seems to assume that the firstborn son of the hated wife is the father’s “first fruit
of his strength,” ונא תישׁ אר, reshit ’ono), hence a reference to Reuben. This is a
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wordplay on Reuben (ןבואר) and correlative with Jacob’s direct oral reference
to him when he revokes these rights to Reuben, “first fruit of my strength”
(ינוא תישׁ אר), on his deathbed in Gen. 49:3, since Reuben “went up to his
father’s bed” (Gen. 49:4). The Chronicler explains that this was a punishment
for his incestuous liaison with Bilhah (1 Chron. 5:1) in Gen. 35:22, and that the
birthright consequently went to Joseph (1 Chron. 5:2), the firstborn son of the
loved wife, in contravention of Deut. 21:15-17.
Ancient Near Eastern laws protected a son from being totally disinherited
unduly: he must commit a serious offense, not once but twice, to be so treated
(LH 168–69: Roth 1997: 113). Biblical law says nothing about offenses that
would be punishable by disinheritance, or of the loss of the right of the preferred
heir, or under what circumstances the double portion would be removed. The
amalgamation of biblical laws and situations, balancing and relating them to
analogous ANE laws and biblical narratives, is, of course, prevalent throughout
the Bible (see, for example, Brenner 1996: 129–31).
Using the legal-literary paradigm, I shall argue that Deut. 21:15-17 was
created by the authors of the Bible solely for the purpose of the complex
narratives behind Gen. 35:22. Here, there are two firstborns, and Reuben’s
story, so much briefer than Joseph’s, may be in many ways far more complex
psychologically, even if it is not the literary tour de force of the Joseph cycle.
Westbrook states that Joseph’s double portion was transferred to Ephraim and
Manasseh when the tribes of Israel divided up the land of Canaan (Josh. 14:4,
17). Moreover, that the allotment of the double portion to Joseph was
“legitimate” and did not contravene Deut. 21:15-17, due to “the sin of his first-
born son against him [Jacob]” (Westbrook 1991: 136 and n2).
This biblical law works so well with the story that, I suggest, it is probably
unlikely to have been composed before Gen. 29:1—30:24 and Gen. 35:22ab
were authored. It could have been created at the same time, or afterward, but
on balance I would suggest that Deut. 21:15-17 was part of the narrative, a kind
of cross-reference. Joseph, as the firstborn son of the loved wife Rachel, receives
Reuben’s inheritance, as 1 Chron. 5:1–2 explains; and Judah, the fourth son of
the primary (albeit hated) wife Lea, becomes through a process of elimination
the blood-inheritor, the ancestor of kings (Gen. 49:10). This is curious because
it is Judah’s idea to sell Joseph (Gen. 37:26-27), and that is a capital offense in
Deut. 24:7: “If a man is found to have stolen a soul from his brothers from
the sons of Israel, enslaving him or selling him, that thief shall die.” Reuben,
however, is the hero who saves Joseph’s life, wishes to rescue him, and mourns
when he is sold (Gen. 37:21-22, 29). This behavior does not soften Jacob’s
attitude toward Reuben or absolve him of sleeping with Bilhah. The close
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narratological relationship between Deut. 24:7 and the selling of Joseph by all
the brothers except Reuben, led by Judah, for twenty pieces of silver to the
Midianites/Ishmaelites (evidence of redaction) in Gen. 37:28 would suggest that
this law, too, is also probably part of the story. Were the law to be implemented,
possibly all the brothers except Reuben and Joseph, the two firstborns signified
in Deut. 21:15-17, would have to be punished by death. Joseph, however,
excuses them all (Gen. 45:4-5; it is uncertain whether he actually forgives them).
Deuteronomy 24:7 is problematic as a general law code since the wording,
if taken literally, really does refer to Joseph (taking Israel to mean Jacob); or,
if the phrase “a soul from his brothers from the sons of Israel” is taken in the
wider sense, the prohibition does not apply to Israelites who steal non-Israelites
and sell them into slavery. Thus Israelites may kidnap gentiles with impunity.
This rather perverse interpretation may be replaced by a more rational exegesis
if one considers that Deut. 24:7 is intended to be part of the dramatic scenery to
Genesis 37, and is not a real law at all.
Revised Literary Laws
The parallel biblical law that is integrated with Deut. 21:15-17, and is an
interesting revision of an ANE law, is the prohibition on marrying two sisters
in their lifetime, Lev. in 18:18: “Do not take a woman as a rival [ ררצל ] to her
sister and reveal her nakedness in the other’s lifetime.
According to Tosato, the law has been interpreted in the Damascus
Document (CD A 4:19–21 and the Dead Sea Scrolls equivalent, 6Q 15 1 1-3.
García Martínez and Tigchelaar 1997–1998: 556–57; 1152–1155) to mean a ban
on polygamy, thereby taking “sisters” to mean “women” rather than biological
relatives (Tosato 1984: 206–7). This may be the case in the Dead Sea Scrolls,
but Schenker argues, alternatively, that “nowhere in the Old Testament is such
a meaning for ‘sister’ attested” (Schenker 2003 [2011]:166, n. 9). Leviticus 18:18
would thus appear to be a succinct and interestingly worded prohibition on
literally marrying the biological sister of one’s wife, thereby creating a “rival
wife” (from the root ררצ Qal; BDB, 865) to the first wife during her lifetime.
This law seems to be a reference to the palpable unhappiness of Leah
while her sister was the favorite wife (Gen. 29:30ab, 31-33; 30:15). It may be
a derivation from the extant Hittite prohibition on marrying two sisters where
both live in the same place (HL 191b: Roth 1997: 236). In HL 191 (Roth
1997: 236), (a) a free man may sleep with two free sisters and (b) with their
mother (c) if they are in different countries, but not in the same geographical
location, presumably because the potential for jealousy is lessened if they resided
in different places. However, if a wife dies, a man is permitted to marry her sister
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(HL 192: Roth 1997: 236; this is also the case according to the wording of Lev.
18:18). In Hittite laws, there are detailed codes distinguishing between sexual
relationships that a free man is allowed to have with women who are related to
each other if they are free, and if they are slaves (not in biblical law).
In the Bible, two adjacent edicts separate and revise the incestuous
character of HL 191 by distinguishing between (d) a man sleeping with related
women from three different generations and marrying the granddaughter (Lev.
18:17) and (e) having conjugal relations with two sisters (Lev. 18:18): “Do not
uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, nor marry her grand-
daughter and uncover her nakedness . . . it is depravity (Lev. 18:17). Lev. 18:17
partly repudiates HL 191 and extends the biblical version of the prohibition
to marrying the granddaughter of the third generation of women (mother-
daughter-granddaughter) with whom the man has had sex. This is a different
incestuous pattern from that of HL 191 (the mother and her two daughters),
which is not brought into the Hittite law at all. The scenario is extremely odd
and has no connection with any biblical narratives.
The wording of Lev. 18:18 carefully absolves the husband from (e)
practicing depravity by sleeping with two biological sisters, but rather focuses
on producing unhealthy competition and unhappiness if the marriage to the
two sisters takes place while they are both alive. It is possible that the audience
was aware that Jacob was committing an offense in both HL 191 (a)(c) (sex with
two biological sisters in the same location), and the Levitical Holiness Code (e)
(marrying two sisters within their lifetimes, one as a rival wife). The unhappy
story thus justifies the biblical law.
There were, however, extenuating circumstances for Jacob’s marrying
Rachel a week after his marriage to Leah (Gen. 29:23-28) that would be taken
into consideration, so as not to condemn Jacob. The fact that Lev. 18:17 and
18:18 reflects all the prohibitions of HL 191 would suggest that the author of
Lev. 18:18 and Gen. 29:1—30:24 may have been inspired by HL 191 (a) as the
infrastructure for the narrative, and that these regional laws were well known.
In HL 194a, a man can have incestuous unions with slave sisters and their
mother, in the same location, unlike with free women (HL 194a: Roth 1997:
236). Hittite Law 194b permits a father and son to have sex with the same
prostitute. The reverse-gender incest case studies, a slave woman having sexual
relations with a father and son in different locations (Gen. 35:21–22, Bilhah
and Reuben and Jacob), or a free woman pretending to be a prostitute having
sex with a father and his sons who are brothers who are her former husbands,
each in their own lifetimes consecutively (Genesis 38, Tamar and Judah, Er and
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Onan) could well constitute biblical case law while echoing a gender reversal of
HL 191 and 194, and Lev 18:18.
While Jacob may have had a reason for marrying both Leah and Rachel,
there were no extenuating circumstances for taking their servants Zilpah and
Bilhah to bear more children for him as third and fourth wives. This situation
occurred directly as result of the sister-wife rivalry (Gen. 30:4–13). According
to 4QTestament of Naphtali in the Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q215 fr. 1–3, Stone
1996) and the Book of Jubilees (Jub. 28:9), Zilpah and Bilhah were also sisters
(Halpern-Amaru 1999). Their father, תויחא (’Ahiyot, meaning “sisters”), a
member of Laban’s household, was redeemed by Laban when he went into
captivity. Their mother, Hanna (הנח), was a maidservant of Laban, whom
Laban gave to Ahiyot. The Qumran text creates symmetry in Jacob’s household:
the familial relationship between Jacob and Zilpah and Bilhah, two biological
sisters, mirrors his relationship with sisters Leah and Rachel. The emotional
hierarchy of the relationships is also replicated.
A Closer Look at Genesis 35:22
In Gen. 35:22, Bilhah is referred to as a pilegesh, a free woman concubine of
Jacob; that is, she is no longer a slave surrogate womb for Rachel. According to
Bernard Jackson, the ownership of the woman slave who is given to the master
to bear children for her mistress remains with the wife (Jackson 2007: 47). So
upon her mistress Rachel’s death (Gen. 35:18-19), Bilhah should be free. Or is
she? For Ze’ev Falk, citing as an example the unfortunate “concubine” of Judges
19 (Falk 1964: 127), a pilegsh is free to leave. Confusingly, Bilhah is described as
an המא (’amah), which Jackson notes means a slave in perpetuity, and a החפש
(shiphah), a freeborn maid (Jackson 2007: 46–48). However, Edward Bridge
argues that the meanings of the two terms are not dissimilar and that they both
designate slave women (Bridge 2012).
One reading of Gen. 35:22, then, is that Bilhah, now a pilegesh, has, of her
own free will, taken the place of Rachel sexually after Rachel’s death. This, I
suggest, needs an explanation. Having been made to be a surrogate for Rachel,
why would she choose to become Jacob’s concubine and not take her freedom?
If there were an oral tradition, as reflected in Second Temple literature, that
Zilpah and Bilhah were sisters whose parents were part of Laban’s household,
she may have chosen not to leave. Furthermore, if she left the clan, she would
be leaving her two biological children, Dan and Naphtali, as well as Rachel’s
natural offspring, Joseph and Benjamin. Since the incident of Gen. 35:22 almost
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immediately follows the death of Rachel in the text (Gen. 35:16-20), the two
notices are most probably linked.
The law of Lev. 19:20 appears to permit a slave woman who has not yet
been freed and has been acquired by a man as his concubine (the Hebrew term
is שיאל תפרחנ החפשׁ ; see BDB, 358) to be able to be impregnated by another
man before she is manumitted, both of them with impunity. What it actually
states is that a man can impregnate a slave woman who has not yet been freed
and has been acquired as a concubine by another man, but the second man must
bring an indemnity. This law, written from the male point of view, is so specific
and relevant to the discussion on Gen. 35:22 that it may be another theater-
piece law. Given the incestuous nature of the relationships, concerning a father
and son, the situation is more complicated. The wording of this law does not
imply that force of any kind from the second man is permitted. (Incidentally,
Leviticus 21–22 describes the second man’s guilt offering as a ram with which
his sin would be forgiven by a priest. If the law was invented for Reuben’s
liaison with Bilhah, as suggested here, could Reuben’s indemnity be echoed
with irony in Gen 37:31, where all the brothers, seemingly including Reuben,
slaughter a ram and dip Joseph’s garment into its blood?)
Hittite law codes allow a father and son to have intercourse with the same
slave woman, or prostitute (HL 194: Roth 1997: 236), but a son is not allowed
to sleep with his stepmother while the father is alive (HL 190: Roth 1997: 236).
So, was Bilhah a stepmother (Lev. 18:8; Deut. 22:30; 23:1; 27:20), or a slave
wife (Lev. 19:20; 25:44), or, as the mother of four of Reuben’s half brothers, a
maternal aunt (no biblical prohibition)? Did Reuben think that Rachel’s death
changed Bilhah’s status so that she was due to be freed (Lev. 19:20), or so that
she was already free? Is it a surprise to the audience that Bilhah is now described
as Jacob’s concubine? Which laws on sexual partners did Reuben transgress,
exactly?
If Bilhah’s status was that of a slave in perpetuity, she could be passed
from father to son as a piece of property to be inherited (Lev. 25:44-46), a
situation compatible with HL 194. However, since Rachel was dead, Bilhah
may no longer have needed to provide her mistress’s husband with wifely
services. Of note is the information that Israel (Jacob) was in another location
(Gen. 35:21-22a); thus the situation under Hittite legislation would have been
permissible if Bilhah were a freeman and Jacob and Reuben were free females
(HL 191).
Andrea Seri’s important study on women domestic slaves in the Old
Babylonian period (1894–1595 BCE), based on actual contracts, letters, and
documents rather than on official law codes (Seri 2011), reveals that female
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slaves could be purchased as domestic servants for the mistress and as second
wife for her husband where the wife was childless or had a disease (Seri 2011:
51–53, 56; Westbrook 1988: 107–9). In such cases, the slave’s parents would
receive the full betrothal price for their daughter (Seri 2011: 51–52). This does
not seem to be the contract with which Bilhah was given to Rachel (Gen.
29:29; 30:3–8). Although Jacob worked for wages to pay for Rachel, Leah, and
the flocks (Gen. 29–30:18), there is no mention of his paying the betrothal
price for the intimate services of their slaves. In different contracts, upon a
mistress’s death, her slaves and her children could be set free (Seri 2011: 57, 59,
61), although here Dan, Naphtali, Gad, and Asher did not belong to Bilhah
and Zilpah and were clearly adopted by Rachel, Leah, and Jacob (Gen. 30:
3–13); therefore, they were not slaves. Domestic slaves could also be passed
to the mistress’s descendants as inheritance as part of her estate, as they were
considered property, along with crockery and furniture (Seri 2011: 54). They
could also remain in the family if the slave were adopted by or married to a
relative, such as a brother or son (Seri 2011: 59).
If we look at Gen. 35:22 in its legalistic context only, without any
narratological information, the text may be raising several legal issues with
regard to the status of Bilhah as Jacob’s concubine after Rachel’s death. As the
contract with Rachel was no longer in place, if Bilhah was not to be inherited
among the family in perpetuity as a piece of property like a pot or a chair
(though this may have been the case according to Lev. 25: 44-46), was she
obliged, or did she wish to continue providing, free martial duties for Jacob
(as a favored sexual partner, like Rachel)? If Reuben thought that she had slave
status, could he have been making a bid to marry her? Or, if Bilhah were part of
Jacob’s estate, inherited from Rachel, Reuben, if greedy, might try to claim her
in lieu of his expected inheritance from Jacob. For an answer, we would need
to take into account the literary characterization.
Suzanne Scholz argues, on the basis of the vocabulary used, that Reuben
raped Bilhah (Scholz 2004). However, her textual argument is not watertight.
The text states that Reuben “went” (ךליו, vayyelekh) and “lay” (בכשׁ יו, vayyish-
kabh) with Bilhah (Gen. 35:22b). There are no verbs connoting that Bilhah was
forced or subdued in Gen. 35:22. In contrast, the language of Shechem and
Dinah uses “he humbled” (הנעיו, vaye‘anneha) in addition to “he lay” (בכשיו,
vayyishkabh) and he “he took” (חקיו, vayiqqach; Gen. 34:2). The vocabulary
of physical force is certainly used unequivocally in reference to Amnon’s rape
of Tamar (2 Sam. 13:14). Brenner argues that Reuben was trying to usurp
his father’s position as the head of the clan before Jacob’s death (Brenner
1997: 106). According to Carmichael, Reuben was transgressing a prohibition
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on sleeping with his father’s concubines while his father was still alive, and
it was understood that a son would inherit his father’s wives after his death
(Carmichael 1985: 221–23). For Anthony Phillips, Deut. 23:1 was a response to
the events of Gen. 35:22 (Phillips 2002: 247).
In biblical law, as Carmichael and Phillips argue, “Uncovering the father’s
skirt” by sleeping with his wife means that the son committed incest with the
father. The three biblical laws forbidding sex with the father’s wife all relate the
crime to father-son incest. They are as follows:
• Lev. 20:11: “If a man lies with his father’s wife, it is the nakedness of
his father that he has uncovered: the two shall be put to death; their
bloodguilt is upon them.”
• Deut. 23:1: “No man shall take his father’s wife nor uncover his
father’s garment.”
• Deut. 27:20: “Cursed is he who lies with his father’s wife, for he has
uncovered his father’s garment.”
And in HL 190 we read: “If a man has sexual relations with his stepmother, it
is not an offense. But if his father is still living, it is unpermitted sexual pairing”
(Roth 1997: 236). Taking into account the Chronicler’s explanation, it would
appear that Reuben was being punished for a sexual offense against his father,
albeit according to an anachronistic law from the future, rather than being
disinherited for making a power bid, as reflected in the story of Absalom, who
raped David’s concubines (2 Sam. 16:22), and Adonijah, who asked for Abishag
(1 Kgs. 2:13-25).
The same conclusion appears in Second Temple literature where the sexual
intrusion itself is highlighted, such as 4QCommentary on Genesis A (4Q252)
4:3–7; Testament of Reuben 1:37–41; and Jub. 33:6–9. In the Testament of Reuben,
it is stated that Jacob did not touch Bilhah again; and in Jubilees it is also specified
that Jacob did not touch her again because Reuben had uncovered his father’s
skirt, attesting to anachronistic legal knowledge. However, Jub. 33:15–17 adds
that Reuben’s crime was to sleep with Bilhah while Jacob was still alive, but
that the law had not yet been revealed. This is interesting because not only
does Jubilees accept that Reuben’s lack of knowledge about Mosaic laws to
come constitute mitigating circumstances (and is inconsistent with Jacob’s final
response), but also the legal reference to the prohibition on having relations
with the stepmother while the father is alive is specified in ANE law only, not
in the biblical codes.
The Mosaic laws against apparent incest by proxy (“uncovering the father’s
skirt” by sleeping with the stepmother) seems to extend to a prohibition on
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homosexuality by proxy, as reflected in Deut. 24:1-4. This law suggests that
a former husband may be polluted by his ex-wife’s second husband, if he
remarries her, even when she has been widowed by husband number two. (In
our literary-legal paradigm, it may be argued that the audience was aware that
this law was contravened by David in 2 Sam. 3:12-16. Such an interpretation
would add an extra dynamic to the scene of Paltiel crying after Michal as she
is being led away. Accordingly, it is possible that Deut. 24:1-4 is an invented
law for literary impact. Note that 2 Sam. 6:23 may suggest that David did not
have sex with Michal after taking her away from her second husband, and thus
probably did not contravene Deut. 24:1-4.) In contrast, ANE law does not
have a prohibition on homosexuality (other than father-son, under the incest
proscription, HL 190), and neither are there any laws preventing a man from
remarrying his former wife after she has had a second husband.
If we examine Gen. 35:22 contextually with the narrative, Reuben’s
motives should be weighed in terms of his character. It may be argued that
that Reuben’s efforts to save Joseph in Genesis 37 and his appearance in the
sexually laden mandrake scene (Gen. 30:14-16) set him up in the literary-legal
framework as a compassionate person and a son who knew of the difficult
sexual politics of his father’s house. The saving of Joseph shows that of all the
brothers, Reuben had a heart. Legally there is another subtext since Joseph,
firstborn son of the loved wife, was Reuben’s rival for his inheritance. It is
not inconsistent with Reuben’s character to suggest that he may have wished
to rescue Bilhah from Jacob, thereby freeing her from performing intimate
duties after her mistress had died (Lev. 19:20; 25:44-46), but this theory would
presume anachronistic knowledge of the Mosaic law against incest. Since the
text does not state that Reuben raped Bilhah, the situation may have been
consensual (although in Testament of Reuben and Jubilees, Bilhah is raped by
Reuben while she is asleep after Reuben has been aroused by the sight of her
bathing).
Primogeniture and Sexual Transgression
as a Legal-Literary Catalyst
In sum, for the discourse on Gen. 35:22, the intersection of biblical narrative
and law would mean that the audiences perceived that the various legal codes
were implicit in certain scenes in Genesis. Since Reuben loses his inheritance
rights because of his union with Bilhah (Gen. 49:4; 1 Chron. 5:1-2), it would
appear that biblical laws were put into practice anachronistically. The
Chronicler attributes the biblical prohibition of uncovering the father’s skirt,
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Lev. 18:8; 20:11; and Deut. 22:30; 23:1; 27:20, a euphemism for father-son
incest (Phillips 2002, 245–50), as the reason for the loss of Reuben’s inheritance.
Conversely, Reuben’s actions possibly would be permissible in biblical law (Lev.
19:20) and in the Hittite legal codes (HL 194) if Bilhah did not yet have the
status of a free woman; and according to HL191, if she were free, because Jacob
was in another land.
The audience, according to the legal-literary paradigm, may also have been
familiar with the epic biblical theme of the younger taking the birthright of the
older. Until this point, the loss of primogeniture was caused by murder (Cain
and Abel), banishment (Ishmael and Isaac), or trickery (Esau and Jacob). The
audience could have anticipated that something would happen to Reuben, the
firstborn in the next generation. Yet no one killed Reuben, or displaced him, or
tricked him out of his inheritance. The twist in Reuben’s birthright was that he
was the eldest son of the hated wife (Deut. 21:15-17), a law that was probably
redacted or composed at the same time as Gen. 35:22 to work with the Genesis
story, and I suggest that Reuben did not want such an inheritance. I posit that
he ensured that his double portion would be transferred to Joseph, the eldest
son of the favored wife, the rival wife. Thus Lev. 18:18 is the foundation of
Deut. 21:15-17 and the background to Gen. 35:22. The narrative twist and
drama completely intertwines with purpose-made biblical legal codes such as
Lev. 19:20, and law codes that permitted such a liaison. The beauty of this
drama is that due to the plethora of laws and the sympathetic appearance of
Reuben in the narrative in relation to his family, there are many interpretations.
An unwritten law is that each generation must see a loss of primogeniture; it is
my submission that this was Reuben’s method.
Judah and Tamar
In the same group of Hittite laws on sexual prohibitions and permission, HL
193ab states: “If a man has a wife, and the man dies, his brother shall take his
widow as wife. If the brother dies, his father shall take her. . . . [HL 193c: When
afterwards his father dies, his brother shall take the woman that he had]” (Roth
1997: 236).” That is an outline of the plot in Genesis 38 about Judah and Tamar.
The biblical author poses the question of what is acceptable: should Levirate
marriage really be permissible even where diagonal, cross-generational incest is
involved?
The biblical law repudiates the Hittite law and, thereby, Judah’s sexual
encounter with Tamar (Gen. 38:16, 18).
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• Lev. 18:15: “Do not uncover the nakedness of your daughter in law;
she is your son’s wife, you shall not uncover her nakedness.”
• Lev. 20:12: “If a man lies with his daughter in law, both of them shall
be put to death; they have committed incest, their blood guilt is upon
them.
In addition, Tamar commits the crime of being a cult prostitute (for an
alternative view, see Westenholz 1989), contravening Deut. 23:18. However,
like Jacob’s wedding night with Leah, Judah consorted with Tamar as a result
of her being in disguise; hence, there were apparent extenuating circumstances
for breaking the law. Genesis 38 condones this Levirate situation: Perez, Judah
and Tamar’s firstborn twin who usurped his brother in the womb, becomes
the ancestor of David (Ruth 4:18), also through another Levirate marriage
instigated by the widow Ruth. The crime of Judah—father-son incest through
his daughter-in-law—is the mirror image of Reuben’s son-father incest through
his father’s wife. Hence, circumstances are more important than the laws
themselves, each case being judged on its merit.
Aside from the legal mirroring, there is a literary form-critical connection
between the stories of Judah in Genesis 38 and Reuben. In the narrative, we
learn of Reuben’s unspoken intentions in Gen. 37:22d: he intends to return to
the pit to rescue Joseph. Similarly, in Genesis 38 we hear Judah’s thoughts as
he schemes to keep Tamar from marrying Shelah (Gen. 38:11c). By contrast,
Reuben saves Joseph; Judah sells Joseph, but Deut. 24:7, which views such a sale
as a capital offense, is buried by the narrative.
There may be a didactic element to the number of laws created and broken
in the Jacob-Reuben-Judah epicycle that are possibly associated with what
seems to be a likely structural and intellectual link connecting the group of
Hittite legal codes HL 190, 191, 193, 194; Lev. 18:15, 17, 18; and chapters 29,
30, 32, and 38 in Genesis. It is still possible to follow the story in its own right,
as well as its echoes in Ruth, without being familiar with the possible influence
of ANE laws on these narratives. This, I argue, is not so much the case with the
storylines of Hagar and Ishmael.
Hagar and Ishmael
The story of Sarai/Sarah and Hagar may be a dramatization of several early
Mesopotamian laws governing the relationship between the primary wife and
the second, slave wife when the latter has a child before the primary wife. The
legal documentary corpus includes inheritance laws in these situations, and the
laws of adopting the slave’s children for inheritance purposes. Corresponding
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laws in the Bible are absent, possibly because the relevant stories in Genesis are
set in a bygone time and the practice of surrogacy had ceased.
In the Laws of Hammurabi, the preferred heir is the son of the first-ranking
wife, and he has the right to choose his share before the children of a slave wife,
even when the latter’s children were adopted by the father (LH 170: Roth 1997:
113–14). Hagar’s son was not Sarai’s son, having been promised to Abram and
Hagar separately in different annunciations (Gen. 15:18-21; 16:10-12; Frymer-
Kensky 2002: 231–232). Ishmael’s name was given by an angel (Gen. 16:11d)
or by Abram (Gen. 16:15, according to redactions), not by Sarai, in contrast to
the naming of Bilhah’s and Zilpah’s children by Rachel and Leah.
The harsh treatment meted out to Hagar by Sarai (Gen. 16:6b, 9) because
she felt diminished in Hagar’s eyes (Gen. 16:5) may have been drawn from LH
146 (Roth 1997: 109) as a source of inspiration. In this law, if a wife is a temple
devotee not permitted to bear children (nadītu) (Roth 1997: 271; Seri 2011:
51n2) and the purchased slave wife aspires to equal status with the primary wife
after she has borne children, the mistress “shall place upon her the slave-hairlock
and she shall reckon her with the slave women.”
Laws governing the fleeing of slaves, whether or not due to harsh
treatment by their mistresses in particular, is well documented in ANE law (Seri
2011: 61); for example, in LH 15–20 (Roth 2011: 84–85), and reflected in the
Bible (Gen. 16:6-9). From the literary viewpoint, the first conflict between Sarai
and Hagar before Isaac is born (Genesis 16) gives the point of view of both
women; Hagar’s plight is presented sympathetically.
Documents from the practice of Nuzi Akkadian law on adoption7 describe
contracts that protect the second wife’s children from being sent away by
the primary wife (Meek 1992: 168–69). Sarah explicitly contravenes this code
because she does not want Ishmael to be an heir with Isaac (Gen. 21:10). Such
a conflict appears to be reflected in a letter from the Old Babylonian period
(Seri 2011: 56; Veenhof 2005: 189). This text contains the line, “A father with
sons does not adopt his slave son.” Seri suggests the reference may allude to the
fact that “the slave son whom the father in our letter adopted was born to a
domestic slave who was the master’s concubine.” If so, one may infer that these
resentments constituted real human dramas and provided the stuff of literature.
It may have been more common for the arrangement to work. There are
ANE documents showing the opposite case: a papyrus record from Thebes
during the later Egyptian New Kingdom period (twentieth dynasty, ca.
1104–1075 BCE) details that a man adopted his second wife as his daughter so
that she could inherit his estate. After his death, she left the entire inheritance
to the three children of the slave woman, two girls and a boy, presumed to
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have been fathered by her husband, by adopting them as well as the husband
of the elder daughter, her own brother. She also emancipated them (Ashmolean
Museum, AN1945.96).
Not only is it clear that women in Egypt were allowed to own and
distribute property, but here Sarah certainly wields some power and influence
over the matter of who should inherit Abraham’s estate. In ancient
Mesopotamia, if the slave wife’s son was adopted by the husband, he was a joint
heir with the primary wife’s son, who had the privilege of taking first choice of
the inheritance (LH 170: Roth 1997: 113–14). It is evident that Abraham had
adopted Ishmael and that it was the intention that he would be an heir (Gen.
16:2), as the narrator refers to Ishmael as Abraham’s recognized son (albeit not
Sarai/Sarah’s, 16:15; 21:11), a legal requirement for adoption and inheritance
purposes (LH 170). If the father did not call his slave wife’s offspring “My
children”—that is, adopt them—those children were not entitled to a share of
the estate (LH 171).
Where the slave’s son is not adopted by the father in the Laws of
Hammurabi, the primary wife’s son becomes the rightful heir over the slave
wife’s son and the slave woman and her children are freed (LL8 25: Roth
1997: 31; LH 171: Roth 1997: 114). This rule may be reflected in the narrative
of Hagar and Ishmael’s release into the wilderness (Gen. 21:14). Although
the legal-literary theory is speculative, we may hypothesize that audiences
likely realized these legal customs were being referenced. This background
knowledge adds depth to the narrative. As in the ANE codes, the slave women
in the biblical narratives are servants of the mistress, not her husband; and it
is their mistresses who control the slaves’ conjugal situation. Also, as in the
ANE codes, the children of the slaves such as those in the biblical stories can be
adopted by the husband to share in the inheritance of his estate.
The significance of divine intervention in absolving Sarah of wrongdoing
for Ishmael’s disinheritance (Gen. 21:12) becomes meaningful: Sarah was asking
for a situation that would mean a break of contract or established law. It would
also appear that God was involved in a forced un-adoption of Ishmael so that
Isaac was the sole heir, in accordance with Sarah’s wishes. In this way, Hagar
and Ishmael could be freed and Ishmael disinherited (Gen. 21:14; LH 171). The
un-adoption of Ishmael may be evident in Abraham’s distress in that the matter
concerned “his son” (Gen. 21:11), but God assures him that his bloodline will
continue through both Isaac and Ishmael (Gen. 21:12-13).
The scene of the Akedah in Genesis 22 underlines the idea that Abraham’s
faith is being tested, as he loses his first heir by un-adoption and is about to lose
his next firstborn by his primary wife by sacrifice, in contrast to the promise of
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Gen. 12:2. Isaac is described by God as Abraham’s only son (Gen. 22:2, 12, 16);
this is legally correct, since Ishmael would not inherit. Technically, Isaac has
become Abraham’s only heir, not his sole biological son. Without the familiarity
of complex ANE adoption laws, these difficult scenes lose their underlying
Mesopotamian references. The legal aspect is woven here with the literary text,
which highlights Sarah’s attitude, and feelings, toward the arrangement that
Abraham had with Hagar.
Aside from the Nuzi law described, where the son of a surrogate mother
is adopted when the primary wife is barren, the ANE laws do not distinguish
inheritance rights between cases where the primary wife already has children
(Leah: Gen. 29:32-35) before slave wives also bear offspring (Gen. 30:3-13), or
after the slave wives bear children. In the biblical narrative, as in ANE law, the
sons of the primary wives are the preferred heirs: for example, Gen. 35: 23-26
lists the sons in order of their mothers: Leah, Rachel, Bilhah, and Zilpah (see
Jackson 2007: 48 n. 39).
In sum, the references to ANE law codes in the narratives of Hagar and
Ishmael come from a variety of sources. Akkadian Nuzi law protects the son
born to a surrogate mother, who is the rightful heir, from being sent away by
the primary wife. Sarah breaches this law explicitly because she does not want
Ishmael to share the inheritance with Isaac. It is likely that these scenes showed
that her actions were unlawful, even though the feelings of both women are
described by the writer; these are the elements of all good character drama.
Abraham is distressed by the outcomes, as he has clearly adopted Ishmael. His
humane response, showing his character, reveals that the situation is extremely
uncomfortable for him. The literature and the underlying legal references work
together to maintain the theme of the overturning of primogeniture. In LH
170, the son of the first-ranking wife is the preferred heir and takes his share
first, but the estate is divided equally between the primary wife’s son and the
slave wife’s son if the father has called the slave wives’ children “My Son.”
This legal situation has developed in the narrative and becomes a problem for
Sarai/Sarah; her tension is resolved by a contravention of law, an action that is
supported by God.
Conclusion
It has been found that the narratives on sexually transgressive behavior in
Genesis are mirrored in a group of relevant ANE laws and corresponding
biblical laws (supporting the theses of Welch and Berman, mentioned above).
I have further postulated that some biblical laws were actually created to work
with these stories as part of the fiction, possibly authored at the same time,
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or consciously redacted, thereby adding another dimension to the scenes
concerned. In some cases, particularly the case of Reuben and Bilhah, the
intersection of ANE laws and biblical legislation make for a labyrinthine puzzle.
My hypothesis posits not only that the biblical law codes are implicit in the
narratives but also that literary characterization must also be considered in
relation to the plethora of ANE legislation, contracts, and the way actual written
laws affected people’s lives—all rich material for drama.
The issue of the reversal of primogeniture, and sexual transgression as
a means of manipulating the inheritance line, is illustrated with Reuben and
Bilhah, and Judah and Tamar. These underlying themes are a central force
driving the story lines forward within the long-term epic through the
generations. By contrast, classical Greek drama, which may also use law as a
centripetal force in the story lines, is more self-contained. In the case of Hagar
and Ishmael, we should presume that the audience would be aware of the role
of relevant ANE codes on slave wives in the narrative.
Without modern interpreters’ aligning knowledge of ancient legal texts
with the biblical narratives, the story lines lose their dramatic impact, significant
layers of meaning, and possible legal and societal implications. The unfolding
dramatic irony and literary conceit within some trajectories in
Genesis—involving a supposed lack of anachronistic knowledge on the part
of the players—not only segues with internal, literary narrative patterns, but
also involves a relationship with external foreign law codes, biblical laws, and
creatively revised ANE laws that loop back into the narrative. Once all these
textual layers are appreciated in an interactive sense, the stories concerning the
slave wives take on a different light.
Epilogue
I have suggested in this essay that Deut. 24:1-4 may be read as a theatrical piece
of legislation that heightens the dramatic subtext in the David cycle. It has been
used and continues to be used today as a law in rabbinical Judaism to prohibit a
woman from filing for divorce. The phrase in question is in Deut. 24:1d, “and
he writes a bill of divorcement and puts it into her hand and sends her from his
house.” This incidental piece of information in the legislation of Deut. 24:1-4
is interpreted to mean that only a husband can file for divorce, not the wife. In
practice, that has meant that where a marriage breaks down and the man refuses
to give his wife a bill of divorce, she becomes a “chained wife” (Heb. ‘agunah).
The chained wife’s second sexual union, if effected before the first husband
agrees to a divorce, is in rabbinical law an adulterous union, and the children
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from that union and their descendants are mamzerim. They have a lower status
in the community and cannot marry in a synagogue. The incompatible gap
between biblical law and literature and institutional theology is a living issue
today. And this is but one example.
The well-known rabbi mentioned in the prologue to this essay has said
at another meeting I attended that the law on the “chained wife” cannot
be changed because it emanates from the word of God. Yet all the biblical
passages mentioned here involve different narratives of legal contraventions,
circumventions, and redemption. The idea that institutional modern religion
can adopt a brutal interpretation of an incidental phrase within a possibly
fictitious and spurious Deuteronomic law, create a rule out of it, and implement
it in such a fixed way so as to not leave any maneuver for a loophole whatsoever,
appears to be in stark contrast to the practice of biblical case law on conjugal
relationships, which is anything but straightforward.
Notes
1. The Laws of Hammurabi (LH) were compiled ca. 1750 BCE and were repeatedly copied
over the centuries in Mesopotamian scribal centers. The references to these codes are from Roth
1997: 76–142. Background and description: Roth 1997: 71–76; Tetlow 2004: 53–72. For a
comparative description of this law code with the other Mesopotamian codes, earlier and later, see
Tetlow 2004: 205–20. Website for the Code of Hammurabi, translated by L. W. King (early
twentieth century): http://www.ancienttexts.org/library/mesopotamian/hammurabi.html
(retrieved March 6, 2012). I am grateful to Athalya Brenner and Sandra Jacobs for some useful
references used in this article.
2. The earliest copies of the Hittite Laws (HL) date to the Old Hittite period (ca. 1650–1500
BCE), from their capital Hattusha, in present-day Turkey, and copies were made until 1150 BCE
(Roth 2007: 217–47; translated and introduced by Harry A. Hoffner Jr., 215–17). Further
commentary and summary: Tetlow 2004: 178–88.
3. A day after I put forward these observations at the ISBL session in London, July 2010,
two papers were given in the SBL Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Law section
expressing a similar theory. These were “A Structural Comparison of Hittite Laws 187–200,
Leviticus 18:6–23, and Leviticus 20: 1–21,” by J. W. Welch of Brigham Young University; and
“Law Code as Story Line: Deuteronomy 24:16–25:10 and LH 1–5 as Literary Templates in
Biblical and Mesopotamian Tradition,” by J. Berman of Bar Ilan University. Also see Berman
2007: 22–38.
4. Plato, Laws 8.838A–B (Bury 1926; see also Ostwald 2009: 151).
5. The plotline of a woman having her husband killed apparently to be with her lover is a
recurrent story in modern film, for example, Double Indemnity, The Postman Never Rings Twice,
Body Heat, The Last Seduction, all with a final twist.
6. Translation: my modification of JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 2003).
7. See Pritchard 1969: 219–20. Nuzi (formerly Gasur near Kirkuk) in northern
Mesopotamia was taken over by the Hurrians in ca. 1800 BCE, and they changed its name to
Nuzi. The tablets date from the middle of the second millennium BCE (Roux 1992: 234–35; Meek
1992, 167).
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8. The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 BCE) were mainly found in Nippur in Lower
Mesopotamia, as well as in Kish (Roth 1997: 24); translations: Roth 1997: 24–35; background:
Tetlow 2004: 15–18.
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